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ABSTRACT 
 
Both public authorities and private companies increasingly outsource 
facilities management services to external suppliers. A new service industry 
with its own culture and contracting practices is developing. This study 
discusses factors that influence trust and relationship culture in the 
Swedish FM sector. A multilevel perspective is taken, so that processes on 
institutional and market levels are discussed in relation to contract 
principles and management as well as interpersonal relations. The study is 
based on a review of FM literature and interviews with leading clients, 
consultants and service providers. The findings are analysed using general 
theories on sources of trust and the relationship between trust and 
contract. A general background on the development of FM is included, 
and the empirical section outlines views on trends, market structure, 
contract models, procurement, contract relationships and management, 
differences between clients, etc. The discussion focuses more specifically 
on trust issues. It is concluded that while industry level efforts to develop 
standard contract and create trust in contracting out FM services have 
been successful, contracting practice is slower to harmonize because of the 
influx of first time clients. Although there does not seem to be a 
straightforward relation between contract design and relationship quality, it 
was found that detailed service specifications and active monitoring may 
support both learning and trust since they entail mutual understanding and 
focused discussions. Less extensive contracts may, paradoxically, result in 
less innovation because of lower client and supplier engagement. This risk 
is higher when FM services are perceived as support services compared to 
when they are seen as strategic service relations. Further, it is concluded 
that since relational trust develops between client employees and supplier 
employees who interact closely, services need different kinds of 
management depending on the interaction patterns they entail. Typically, 
low level interaction relations such as technical property services may need 
a focus on fostering trust, while soft services call for formalization and 
distance.  
 iv 
 
 v 
 
CONTENTS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
2. CHANGES IN CORPORATE REAL ESTATE MANAGEMENT................ 2 
3. OUTSOURCING........................................................................................................... 3 
4. THE SWEDISH SITUATION: A BACKGROUND ........................................... 4 
5. FM CONTRACTS ......................................................................................................... 6 
6. RESEARCH ON FM CONTRACTS AND RELATIONSHIPS ...................... 9 
7. TRUST IN BUSINESS RELATIONS ...................................................................11 
8. RESEARCH DESIGN ............................................................................................... 15 
9. INTERVIEW RESULTS ........................................................................................... 16 
10. DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................... 32 
11. CONCLUSIONS.......................................................................................................... 37 
REFERENCES....................................................................................................................... 38 
 vi 
 
 vii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
The author would like to thank the interviewees for generously sharing 
their experiences and Formas, the Swedish Research Council for 
Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning, for funding. I am 
also grateful to Josefin Sporrong for assistance in taking notes and 
transcribing interviews, and to Jan Bröchner for feedback on analysis.   
 
Göteborg 27 June 2007 
 
Anna Kadefors 
 
 
 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Both public authorities and private companies outsource their facilities 
management services to external suppliers. One background to this 
development is that corporate real estate management has undergone 
important changes in many companies in the recent decades (Bon, Gibson 
and Luck, 2003). Increased globalization and competition has lead to a 
more strategic management approach to all business areas, often resulting 
in centralized management of various support functions. Both 
manufacturing companies and real estate companies increasingly prefer to 
buy facilities management (FM) services from external contractors. In the 
UK, over 50% of non-core services are considered to be outsourced, and 
the market growing with 10% annually (Davis, 2004). In the Nordic 
countries, perhaps 25% of the volume of facilities management services is 
outsourced (Jensen, 2006; Capgemini, 2005). Which services are 
outsourced vary, as well as the organization form chosen. In some cases 
all, or the main part, of the FM-related services are bought from external 
suppliers, while in other cases it is individual services. Some clients prefer 
to relate to a single FM integrator, who then often subcontracts part of the 
work, while other clients retain the integrator role, procuring several 
separate contractors for various services. Further, although European 
companies still own their property to a greater extent than US companies 
do (Laposa and Charlton, 2001), top management attention frequently 
leads to corporate real estate being sold to external independent investors 
such as insurance companies and banks. This implies that new relations 
emerge, where roles are separated in different legal entities without 
ownership links and are related to each other by explicit and formal 
contracts.  
 
There are different categories of FM services: strategic asset management, 
financial and administrative property management, building operations and 
maintenance, and business services (reception, catering, mail distribution, 
copier services, workplace relocation). Other related activities concern 
workspace planning, construction project management, as well as business 
services closer to core business but with a weaker relation to physical 
structures (HR, finance, purchasing, IT). Thus, FM is a complex area, and 
a number of market segments are brought together by facilities 
management activities (McLennan, 2004). Although FM is not a new range 
of services in terms of their contents, outsourcing them is often new. 
Practices, regulations and competences develop on several levels –  
market/industry , organizations and individuals – in parallel and 
interrelated learning processes. The aim of this paper is to gain an 
increased understanding of how relationship governance develops in this 
complex setting and of the interaction between processes on different 
levels More specifically, the research question concerns processes of 
development of trust and constructive collaboration in FM relations.  
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In the following sections, the international background to the increased 
role of outsourcing is discussed more in detail, and the Swedish and 
Nordic situation is outlined. Research on FM contracts is summarized, 
followed by an overview of the general research on trust in relationship to 
contract. Then, findings from an interview study in the Swedish FM sector 
are summarized and discussed in relation to the theoretical framework. 
 
2. CHANGES IN CORPORATE REAL ESTATE 
MANAGEMENT 
Before the 1970s, there were no corporate real estate management (CRE) 
functions in large US companies (Page and Valenziano, 2000). Real estate 
decisions were typically made by business unit managers or facilities staff, 
and businesses primarily operated in owned buildings constructed to their 
specifications. When corporations grew, specialised real estate 
management functions were established. These CRE functions were 
generally placed at headquarters, and while being competent in real estate 
management they typically did not have close contact with the core 
business. Consequently, CRE functions were frequently perceived by the 
business units as overstaffed bureaucracies with a lack of customer focus. 
When market values of real estate rapidly increased in the 1980s, dealing 
with real estate became a business opportunity in itself, frequently leading 
to tendency to assign lower priority to the needs of core business as well as 
to the running costs of the built facilities (O’Mara, 1999). The reaction to 
this development was a movement towards decentralisation, where 
overheads were reduced and the business units increasingly were run as 
separate companies. Real estate management was again embedded in the 
business unit, fostering greater trust and motivation to perform (Page and 
Valenziano, 2000). However, this brought new problems with duplication 
of functions and weaker adherence to company-wide standards. When the 
recession then came in the early 1990s, alongside with increasing 
globalisation, there was less tolerance for local level bureaucracy and 
bespoke systems, giving rise to a trend to re-centralize decisions and 
routines again. 
 
According to O’Mara (1999), decision making in the late 1980s and early 
1990s represented a ‘minimize-cost mindset’, in which facilities were 
viewed mainly as cost generators. The focus was on cutting costs by 
reduction of space or by outsourcing of building services to contractors. 
However, since minimizing FM costs in the short run may lead to higher 
indirect costs or impede longer-term competitive advantage for the core 
business, O’Mara formulates the need for a ‘strategic mindset’, 
emphasizing that real estate and facilities management decisions should be 
closely related to the general company strategy. Along the same lines, Page 
and Valenziano (2000) describe a trend, beginning in the mid 1990s, 
towards a more strategic role of corporate real estate management. They 
point out that the new models are or were to some extent made possible 
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by the emergence of new (information) technology, notably common 
platforms that facilitate rapid exchange of information. Still, authors on 
corporate real estate management continue to complain that property 
management is poorly connected to business strategy (Glagola, 1999, 2001; 
McNamara, 2002). However, the importance of FM competencies to a 
core business will vary between type of competence as well as type of 
business (Price, 2004). Facilities management is more strategic in 
businesses that “trade through their space” (McLennan, 2004), such as 
theatres, retail, restaurants and hotels, where the impact of facilities on 
customer preferences and, thereby, on profits, is direct. In the case of 
office related space and services the impact is indirect. Related to this 
struggle to find an appropriate role is a concern in the FM area that people 
outside the discipline have no clear understanding of what FM stands for. 
Further, due to different backgrounds, mind-sets and cultures, there can 
be considerable confusion and lack of consensus also among the various 
actors within the area (Green and Price, 2000).  
 
The picture that emerges is that in many organizations, the FM or real 
estate management function does not have a strong strategic role, and that 
much attention still being focused on cutting short term costs. Nutt (2004) 
argues that, in the UK, the focus on “best value” and “excellence” in 
public discourse has inflated expectations for service improvement and 
lower costs far beyond what is realistic to achieve.  
 
3. OUTSOURCING  
The trend to buy services from external, specialized facilities service 
providers became more pronounced in the 1990s. In the case of many 
large companies, this implies that in-house corporate real estate and 
facilities management units are outsourced to an external service provider, 
which takes over the personnel. Sometimes, new companies are created 
from large CRE units, which are then operating as independent agents on 
the market and competing for new contracts. Outsourcing is frequently 
seen as a sign of corporate capa bility and efficiency, and CRE departments 
have often some pressure from their companies to outsource. Echoing the 
mainstream literature on outsourcing of services, Glagola (2001) mentions 
three main sources of cost reductions and other economic effects 
associated with outsourcing (see also Farncombe and Waller, 2005 and 
Usher, 2004): 
 
- that outside providers have a lower cost structure;  
- that transfer of assets such as facilities, equipment and vehicles to a 
service provider results in cash payment that can be used to 
develop the core business; 
- a reduced need to invest in non-core business functions.  
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Outsourcing can also be an opportunity to change relationships to core 
business and have the CRE manager evolving from a manager of day-to-
day functions to a participant in the strategic development of the business 
(Adkison, 1999; McNamara, 2002; Glagola, 2001), something which is 
difficult as long as a large proportion of CRE staff is engaged in 
performing time consuming routine tasks. Technology is said to be both 
an enabler and a driver of outsourcing: new information technology and 
FM databases obviously make it easier to manage facilities at a distance, to 
specify contracts and to monitor performance, but these new tools are also 
expensive when training and other costs of implementation are taken into 
account (Glagola, 2001). As an external provider can spread investment 
costs and training costs across many customers, this becomes an additional 
reason for outsourcing.  
 
Especially when contracts with a number of separate FM suppliers are 
preferred to total service providers, the organization of FM services often 
becomes more complex than with in-house arrangements, and therefore 
less transparent to the serviced core-business units. Another aspect that 
adds complexity is if company facilities are sold to external investors. 
Some FM services will typically be contracted or supplied by the user, 
while the owner is responsible for at least some of the technical property 
management functions. 
  
4. THE SWEDISH SITUATION: A BACKGROUND 
Although there is little systematic information publicly available on how 
corporate real estate management has developed in a Swedish context, 
facilities management and property ownership functions in many 
companies and public organisations have clearly undergone important 
changes, in this mirroring the international trend. In several cases, 
independent or semi-independent subsidiaries have been created for 
property ownership and management. Some of these have been spun off 
as separate companies. In a Nordic survey of 29 large companies (not 
including pure real estate owners) and 7 suppliers, Capgemini (2005) found 
a clear trend towards centralization, where FM functions were organized 
according to one of three strategies: as a centralized in-house service unit 
(41%), as a profit center serving both internal and external customers 
(15%), or by outsourcing both operations and management (38%). 
Outsourcing had increased in the companies surveyed, and was expected 
to increase further in the coming years. The respondents reported that the 
perceived significance of FM to core business had grown, and that 
management had become more strategic. However, it was also pointed out 
that this may reflect a period of outsourcing or restructuring efforts; these 
large initiatives require high levels of management attention because they 
affect many employees.  
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Although most single service suppliers are small and local companies, 
there is a trend that the supplier market is being consolidated, so that large 
international service providers acquire the local Swedish firms. Service 
providers tend to grow by buying other firms rather than by winning new 
contracts. Today, there are few medium-sized supplier companies, while 
the large service suppliers often partly consist of outsourced FM functions 
of large Swedish industry firms, property owners or public entities. 
Competition in the field of FM has increased in recent years and many 
service providers suffer from poor profitability. This has put more 
pressure also on internal FM units, which are challenged by benchmarking 
with other companies (Capgemini, 2005). However, for integrated FM 
there is some concern among buyers that competition is too low 
(Capgemini, 2005; Jensen et al, 2006). 
 
In the public sector, outsourcing of operations and maintenance of 
hospitals, public building and grounds, as well as other infrastructure 
systems has increased significantly. According to Sundsvik (2006), the 
general opinion in the industry is that 20% of the Swedish local authorities 
have procured technical property management services from external 
providers, resulting in a total of 100 contracts of this type. From a study 
comprising information from 33 of these contracts, Sundsvik (2006) 
concludes that there are considerable differences between different 
contracts, depending on type of service, client ambitions and competence, 
and local conditions (market, etc). However, nearly all respondents are 
relatively satisfied with contract performance, although they acknowledge 
that this is an evolving practice and that there is still much room for 
improvements. None of the clients planned to insource any of the work 
outsourced, and there was a belief that outsourcing would increase.   
 
FM outsourcing in the Nordic countries can be seen as lagging in an 
international comparison, and the market for FM services has not 
increased as predicted some five years ago. In the study by Capgemini 
(2005) Sweden was considered to be the Nordic country where the FM 
market is the most developed, but this position seems less clear in a report 
from the Nordic Facilities Management Network (2006). Probably, the 
discrepancy is partly due to the difficulty to map this complex area were 
definitions vary both within and between countries. Also, it is misleading 
to think that countries can just be assigned evolutionary positions on a 
time scale. Factors such as facility scale and physical distances must be 
taken into consideration (Bröchner et al., 2002). Low population density 
and considerable distances within the country both contribute to higher 
reliance on in-house resources. Jensen et al (2006) further argue that in 
international comparison the Nordic FM market depends more strongly 
on public clients. Other regional  characteristics mentioned are that 
building related issues tend to be more important due to the colder 
climate, that cultural aspects such as trust in institutions as well as in 
employees are favourable to flexibility and new technology, and that high 
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wages and employment costs create strong financial motivation to improve 
efficiency in all service activities. 
 
Another significant development worth mentioning is that there has been 
a great increase in foreign property investment in Sweden in the last 
couple of years. Since 2003, activity in the Swedish real estate market has 
been exceptionally high and continuously rising. In 2005, property for 
SEK 123 billion was sold, almost three times the value of 1999. Also, the 
proportion of foreign investors has increased, averaging around 50% of 
the property bought during 2003-2005 (www.newsec.se). In 2006, Sweden 
was on place three in Europe in the volume of foreign property 
investments. This has consequences for the Swedish FM market. Foreign 
property owners usually lack internal FM units and they are more used to 
dealing with external service providers than the Swedish owners. 
Moreover, a geographically distant owner requires facility management 
contractors who can assume greater responsibility and take on a more 
independent management responsibility in relation to tenants, in some 
cases on a nation-wide basis.  
 
5. FM CONTRACTS  
A complete FM contract comprises several documents, specifying 
responsibilities, key performance indicators, compensation principles and 
management routines as well as descriptions of the premises and 
organizations served. The scope and level of detail vary considerably 
between cases, and the contract in a complex FM delivery can be very 
extensive in terms of information included. Buyer-seller relationships in 
most industries vary in level of trust and collaboration. Arms’ length, or 
transactional, relationships are characterized by unambiguous quality 
specifications, and price is the main criterion for supplier selection. This 
route is often used for simple products and services, where there are many 
alternative suppliers. When exchange is more complex and the parties 
become dependent, partnership sourcing, or relational contracting, is more 
common. In this kind of contract, initial price is less important, since 
services and volumes are expected to change, and more attention is paid to 
supplier competence and cultural fit. In FM, there are both transactional 
relations and partnerships. Often, relations become closer as contracting 
experience increases. Thus, a general company policy of outsourcing of 
services might be the start rather than the result of a more strategic and 
customer oriented role for the in-house FM function. This calls for more 
flexible contractual solutions.  
 
Service specifications and service level agreements 
A key feature in most FM contracts is a Service Level Agreement (SLA), 
where the quality and volume of the work contracted is described. In-
house FM services are often poorly documented, and it is generally 
emphasized that the first step in change effort aiming at restructuring and 
 7 
 
perhaps outsourcing an FM department is to map and reassess existing 
service levels (Barret and Baldry, 2003; Pratt, 2003; Davis, 2004; 
Capgemini, 2005), a process that often results in changes in types, levels 
and volumes of service. If the FM department is kept in-house, SLAs will 
structure the FM services delivered and provide a basis for performance 
appraisal and benchmarking with other core businesses or external 
suppliers (Atkin and Brooks, 2000, Amarantunga and Baldry, 2002 a; b). 
When SLAs are  used to procure external service providers, they facilitate 
comparison between bidders and reduce misunderstandings as to quality 
levels between the client and the service provider, apart from their role to 
define responsibilities in the legal contract. Thus, SLAs are seen as central 
tools for FM, whether outsourced or not. It is often assumed that the SLA 
is developed by the client, but in practice it is often the larger service 
providers that supply the SLAs, the reason being that clients lack 
contracting experience and competence. Recently, a European standard 
identifying the aspects to be included in an SLA was issued. 
 
The concept of Service Level Agreement, however, is very wide, and there 
is considerable variation in how easily different FM services may be 
specified and measured. There are two main specification principles: input 
or process specification and output or performance specification. Process 
specifications are generally seen as characteristic of arms’ length, 
transactional relationships, and are considered to have the disadvantages 
that significant resources are required upfront, that innovation may be 
limited and that relations may become adversarial (Davis, 2004). 
Performance specifications are often seen as preferable (Atkin and Brooks, 
2000), although they are not automatically related to a more collaborative 
and innovative contracting environment (Price, 2002). Development and 
flexibility is more likely in a partnership sourcing model, where an open 
book approach with shared savings is used. Often, there is an agreed profit 
margin and thus less conflict between the parties. Davis (2004) maintains 
that also in this type of partnership approach, service levels should be 
described and a pricing document prepared. Still, discussions may arise 
when cost-saving initiatives require capital investment.  
 
Monitoring is closely connected to specification, and Key Performance 
Indicators are developed to measure efficiency and enhance performance. 
These may be based on inspections, data generated by IT systems or 
customer satisfaction surveys. Especially in the latter case, inspiration is 
sought in general service management research, emphasizing importance 
of exceeding customer expectations (Bandy, 2003). Noteworthy is that 
partnership contracts are considered to require higher costs for 
management and auditing than contracts based on process specifications 
(Davis, 2004). Benchmarking within or between organizations is often 
considered essential for development, but has also been criticised for 
fostering a prescriptive and standardized approach (Young, 2004).   
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Swedish standard contracts 
Sweden has a long tradition of standard contracts, established by specific 
bodies consisting of representatives of different parties. In the 
construction sector, a number of interrelated standard forms of contracts, 
linked to standard specifications, have gained an almost total acceptance. 
These documents can be said to form institutions that reduce information 
costs by standardising roles as well as output (Kadefors, 1995). In the early 
1990s, most Swedish service contracts in the FM area concerned property 
management. As the contracting parties generally came from construction 
and the services were building-related, standard contracts for construction 
work were used. These were poorly adapted to specifying and regulating 
service delivery, and without systematic specification clients found it hard 
to compare bids and even to know what services they had actually 
procured. Therefore, important public clients initiated the development a 
system of standard agreements specific for property management, building 
on a collection of existing contractual elements from various companies 
and services. The first parts of this Aff system were issued in 1995, and in 
1997 a formal committee was established to administer system changes 
and updates. Today the Aff committee includes more than 30 
organizations representing all types of clients as well as consultants, 
industry organizations and service providers in the field (see www.aff.se). 
In 2004 similar documents pertaining to soft facilities management 
services (business-related services) were developed. The original Aff 
system was based on process (or “frequency”, in the Swedish terminology) 
specifications, but in 2006 documents to support performance 
requirements were added.  
 
The Aff system is a set of documents aiming at regulating responsibilities 
and structuring information related to FM contracts. The system includes 
the following parts:  
General documents: 
- General conditions of contracts 
- Definitions 
- Procurement conditions: suggestions for texts describing the 
procurement process, including requirements for bid contents and 
evaluation principles 
- Specific regulations: guidelines for how to adapt the general 
conditions to a particular contract  
Documents which exist for both property management and business 
services: 
- Descriptions: texts and advice for developing service level 
agreements  
- Schedule of interfaces: checklist to determine which tasks are 
included in the fixed price and which should be priced separately  
- Object description: templates for providing bidders with detailed 
information on the property (quantitative data on buildings, 
systems, etc, and their status) and/or the business served. 
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The Aff system may be combined with the recent European SLA standard 
(EN 15222), so that Aff service specifications are brought into this 
structure (www.nordicfm.org). 
 
So far the Aff standards have not gained a standing comparable to the 
standard contracts for construction, and there is a wide variety in how 
Swedish FM contracts are procured and managed. However, in his 
investigation of public contracts for technical property management, 
Sundsvik (2006) found that the Aff system was used in nearly all contracts 
studied.  
 
6. RESEARCH ON FM CONTRACTS AND RELATIONSHIPS 
Most international research in FM focuses on the role of the corporate real 
estate function or on outsourcing decisions and processes, while research 
on the relationship to service providers is scarcer. As already mentioned, 
there is a general concern that core businesses assign too little importance 
to FM, perceiving it as low margin delivery work and a candidate for cost-
cutting. Price-focused procurement and fierce competition result are 
considered to result in contracts where suppliers try to cut corners and 
shirk on quality to cover their costs.  
 
In a Swedish context, Sundsvik (2006) investigated specification style and 
contract management in public contracts with a rather narrow scope. Most 
of these were fixed price. Only one of 33 contracts used a partnership 
approach. Performance requirements were preferred, and more common 
than process requirements, but combinations were frequent. Most 
respondents said that relations were collaborative, although some clients 
complained that contractors were very quick to find causes to demand 
extra payments. One conclusion was that most contracts and clients lacked 
in system and discipline, especially concerning start up procedures and 
performance appraisal.  
 
Theoretically elaborated studies of FM relationships have been carried out 
by Finnish researchers, who have analysed these contracts in relation to 
the literature on buyer-seller relationships in other industries. There has 
been a trend for Finnish companies to abandon transactional relations in 
favour of wider service packages and partnering approaches, and Lehtonen 
and Salonen (2006) found that relationships in FM formally had many 
characteristics in common with both traditional arms’ length relationships 
and with partnerships. For example, although there were learning and 
development objectives, choice of partner was generally based on price 
and there was no sharing of benefits and risks. Further, contrary to 
partnerships in other sectors, no relation was found between closeness in 
collaboration and contract duration. Salonen (2004) noted that FM 
partnerships differ from other alliances in that they are relatively simple 
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and that there is no need to share sensitive core -business related 
information or to make partner specific investments. Also, alliances are 
established to benefit from economies of scale, not to promote joint 
learning. As a result, relationships do not entail strong dependencies and 
commitment tends to be low. FM services are standardized and there are 
many alternative suppliers. A change of FM partner will thus not influence 
business strategy, and FM partnerships are seen as intrinsically more 
operational than strategic (Lehtonen and Salonen, 2006). However, many 
relationships are close with high levels of trust and commitment, and 
Lehtonen and Salonen (2006) argue that this is because services are 
delivered on the premises of clients. They also found that operational level 
contacts were considered important, as well as the relations between front 
line staff and end-users. Top management support  was seen as crucial in 
the initial set-up but not during the contract period.  
 
In another Finnish study, interviews were carried out with three clients and 
their suppliers, investigating their experiences of both dissolved and 
ongoing relationships (Lehtonen, 2006). The dissolved relationships were 
characterised by poor communication, and lack of mutual understanding 
led to dissatisfaction among end-users, whose expectations were not 
fulfilled. Also, deficient service level agreements led to unclear 
responsibilities. Another problem was that restricted and inflexible 
contracts and lack of incentives resulted in low developmental activities, 
and that more substantial changes in the client organization led to 
relationship dissolution. The perceived success factors were found to be 
largely similar to those in strategic partnerships in other industries: 
problem-solving attitudes, a collaborative culture, mutually agreed goals, 
open and systematic information-sharing, etc. Although well defined SLAs 
and authority systems were considered important, performance 
measurement was not well developed. Lehtonen (2006) concludes that 
there are many benefits of collaborative relations also in cases when 
suppliers are not strategic. First, in more complex and uncertain contracts 
trust is essential, since services and service levels cannot be specified in 
detail. Further, price competition leads to decline in quality also in non-
strategic purchases, which also favors collaborative approaches. For the 
service provider a partnership has the advantage to provide a better margin 
and steady cash-flow.   
 
Innovation does not seem to be considered a high priority in FM. Salonen 
(2004) reported that development activity tended to be low and that the 
communication between client and service provider was poor in Finnish 
FM. In the study by Lehtonen (2006), however, development activities 
occurred and were seen as signs of commitment. In a study of two in-
house organizations and two FM contracts, Mudrak et al. (2005) found 
that the organizations studied had developed processes for innovation 
management and performance assessments, but that innovation tended to 
be incremental . This was explained by the day-to-day nature of FM 
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decision-making and the fast changing demands and needs of the client 
organizations. In more than 20 Nordic relations in the FM sector, Jensen 
et al. (2006) found much development activity, but only two explicit 
innovations.  
 
7. TRUST IN BUSINESS RELATIONS 
Although collaborative action may be induced by coercion, mutual trust is 
generally seen as beneficial to more complex exchange relationships. In 
countries where people in general tend to trust each other it is easier to 
establish successful exchange relations, which has a positive influence on 
the economic growth of these countries (Fukuyama, 1996; Zak and Knack, 
2001). Similarly, adversarial relations in construction have been blamed for 
much of the inefficiency and lack of innovation in this industry (Latham, 
1994; Egan, 1998). Thus, if we wish to understand the factors that 
influence the performance of FM relationships, an analysis of the 
dominant modes of trust production in this context is an important 
starting point. 
 
Trust and production of trust  
In the past decade or two, a vast amount of research on trust and inter-
organizational collaboration has been carried out within various disciplines 
and empirical contexts. This growing trust literature clearly demonstrates 
that there are different forms of trust, linked with different processes of 
trust production. For the purpose of this paper, a basic distinction may be 
made between 1) ex post trust, arising in a relationship involving direct 
interaction between individuals and organizations, and 2) ex ante trust, 
which is present before any actu al exchange takes place. The most 
important basis of ex post trust is personal relationships between 
interacting individuals. Trust with this origin has been labeled “relational 
trust” (Rousseau et al 1998), “trust in the strong sense” (Nooteboom, 
2002), “process-based trust” (Zucker 1986), “identifications-based trust” 
(Lewicki and Bunker, 1996) and “affect-based trust” (McAllister, 1995). It 
implies that tacit mutual understandings and feelings of personal 
attachment will arise and influence behaviour. Interaction between 
individuals is at the heart of trust development processes, although 
emerging first-hand knowledge of company-specific features such as 
routines, culture and systems also belong to this trust category. As 
observed by Marchington and Vincent (2004), much research on inter-
organizational collaboration has treated organizations as homogeneous 
and cohesive agents, ignoring that many boundary spanning agents at 
different organizational levels may be involved in an exchange, often with 
various skills, preferences and motivations. Thus, relations that are arms’ 
length on the top level may be collaborative on the operational level. If the 
terms of exchange are perceived as unfair, for example, decisions made on 
the operational level can to work towards restoring perceived fairness, 
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primarily by measures that are hard for supervisors to detect, such as lower 
quality or delayed delivery  (Kadefors, 1995; Friedberg and Neuville, 1999). 
 
Turning to ex ante trust, two sub-categories can be identified: trust which 
is related to a specific relationship or exchange partner, and generalized 
trust. The first type may be based on company reputation and other 
information about previous performance, certified company systems (ISO 
9000, etc) or information about the competence of individuals employed 
by the company (education, working experience and professional 
accreditation).  
 
Generalized trust, on the other hand, is produced by formal and informal 
institutions on the level of society in general or a specific industry (Zucker, 
1986). Arrighetti et al (1997) refer to the “contractual environment”, 
meaning the “broad normative framework of laws, customs and 
assumptions within which inter-firm relations are embedded”, including 
prevailing notions of what constitutes ethical behaviour in business 
relations. A stable and predictable contracting environment is thought to 
support collaborative interaction. The trustor’s belief in the ability of the 
legal system to justly punish contract breaches influence his or her 
perceptions of the risks involved in contracting. Social norms and general 
business climate will influence both trust and how the parties will actually 
behave in the relationship. For example, a market in which information on 
trustworthiness is transparent, and where a reputation for trustworthiness 
will benefit actors, will be favourable to collaborative relations. Further, as 
mentioned above, perceptions of individual and organizational 
competences are partly founded on trust in the education system and other 
institutions. Specific examples of trust-producing institutions are education 
systems, norming bodies, trade and professional associations, notions of 
craftsmanship, established practice and stereotypes associated with various 
professions or companies. In addition, trust is influenced by general 
cultural stereotypes pertaining to sex, age, accent, ethnicity, clothing style, 
etc.   
 
It may be concluded that the development of trust and collaboration in a 
specific relationship is dependent on actions and traits of the contracting 
parties, but that all exchanges are embedded in an institutional 
environment that influences the behaviour and culture of exchange 
partners (including their propensity to trust) and more specifically how 
transactions tend to be organized. This environment may differ between 
nations and industries, and also with transaction complexity (Arrighetti et 
al, 1997; Marchington and Vincent, 2004). Thus, to understand how 
relationships evolve in an industry, it is important to recognize processes 
on several  levels, from patterns of interaction on the level of individuals 
and companies to the role of trade associations, professional cultures and 
law.  
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Trust, contract and communication 
In the 1960s, Macaulay (1963) suggested that formal contracts play a 
marginal role in governing business exchange, and that informal sanction 
generally was preferred to legal action. Since, research on management of 
inter-organizational collaboration has tended to downplay the role of the 
formal contract (Argyres et al., 2006). More recently, a debate has arisen 
on the relationship between trust and contract : do trust and contracts act 
as substitutes or complements (see Poppo and Zenger, 2002). If trust and 
contracts are substitutes, less trust implies more extensive contracts where 
obligations, monitoring and sanctions for breach of contract are specified 
in detail. When the parties trust each other, there is no need for such 
contractual safeguards, since behaviour will be governed by mutual 
understanding and informa l obligations and sanctions. Then, the norms 
that shape interaction are produced as the relationship evolves, and not 
stated in a contract drafted at an early stage. In this perspective, contracts 
may also be seen as detrimental to trust. Trust has often been observed to 
be governed by rules of reciprocity: shown trust is rewarded by 
trustworthiness while distrust induces opportunism (Berg et al., 1995). 
Thus, to the extent that contracts and monitoring are perceived as 
indications of distrust, they might induce cooperation based on self-
interest but fail to support the development of trust-based co-operation 
(Malhotra and Murninghan, 2002).  
 
However, it may also be argued that trust and contract act as 
complements. This implies that close, collaborative business relations may 
be reinforced rather than threatened by a detailed contract. In their study 
of IT outsourcing relationships, Poppo and Zenger (2002) largely found 
support for their hypothesis that well-specified contracts may promote 
more cooperative, long-term, trusting exchange relationships. Arrighetti et 
al. (1997) studied strategic and explicit long-term business relations in 
Britain, Germany and Italy, and found that these tended to be formalized. 
However, the empirical evidence on the relationship between trust and 
contract is mixed, and several researchers have concluded that the 
relationship context is decisive. Based on a study of partnerships in 
technological innovation, Klein Woolthuis et al (2004) suggested that 
contracts may function as substitutes or complements depending on the 
intentions with which contracts are drawn up and used. Other studies of 
IT outsourcing have emphasised the role of the contracting process itself 
in fostering trust (Barthelemy, 2003; Blomqvist et al., 2005). As mentioned 
above, monitoring and detailed specifications are generally considered to 
have negative effects on behaviour and to counteract goals of learning. 
However such formalization may play an important role in facilitating joint 
sensemaking in interorganizational relationships (Vlaar et al., 2006). 
Formalization focuses participants’ attention and forces them to articulate 
and reflect on relationship aspects, which reduces the risk for 
misunderstandings and also give the parties a better general understanding 
of the task at hand. Thus, that some types of contracts tend to be more 
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extensive may reflect a learning process, where the parties encounter 
difficulties and agree on how they should be handled (Argyres et al., 2007). 
The main difference from relational governance, thus, seems to be that 
mutual expectations are codified.  
 
Albeit from an intra-organizational perspective, Madhok (2006) more 
explicitly addresses the interplay between the need to monitor employee 
performance (incentive problems) and needs to coordinate and facilitate 
knowledge flows within the organization (coordination problems). Thus, 
we could assume that formalization in some cases could be chosen 
primarily for reasons of knowledge management and coordination, and to 
a lesser extent as incentive control. However, concerns to mitigate 
opportunism easily overtake the more strategically important knowledge 
management activities.  
 
Standard contracts  
In many industries, standard contracts are used in a large proportion of 
transactions. One advantage of such contracts is that they reduce the 
resources and time spent in drafting and negotiating. For company-specific 
standard contracts, Argyres and Mayer (2004) state that these  codify 
knowledge and make it possible to delegate certain aspects of contract 
drafting to managers and engineers. Standard contracts further signal 
legitimacy and objectivity (Vlaar, 2005), since they are generally developed 
by firms and other organizations with a solid reputation and accepted by 
all parties involved. Thus, standards promote stability and offset 
asymmetries of power between contracting parties, thereby facilitating 
trust and cooperative behavior (Arrighetti et al., 1997). Standard contracts 
may also reduce ambiguity and the risk that the parties develop equivocal 
interpretations of the contract (Vlaar, 2005).   
 
However, standard contracts may also have disadvantages. Irrelevant 
clauses may cause conflict and delay negotiations, and it is complicated and 
costly to deviate from the standard (Arrighetti et al , 1997). Further, 
standard contracts do not capture aspects that might be important in a 
specific context (Vlaar, 2005). Thus, contracting situations need to be 
similar for standard contracts to be efficient.  Vlaar (2005) further argues 
that a serious disadvantage of standard contracts is that they lead to 
“mindlessness”. Instead of developing mutual expectations in a process of 
drafting a bespoke contract, parties use a standard contract which they 
may not even read. Thereby, the general comprehension of the complexity 
and risks of the exchange is impeded.  
 
Specific questions 
Research on interorganizational relationships in FM in combination with 
research on trust and contracts suggests the following more specific 
research questions:  
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- Which are the important trust problems in FM relations? How are they 
influenced by factors on an institutional level?  
 
- How does specification style (performance requirements/process 
requirements) influence relationship style (transactional/partnership)?  
Does performance monitoring produce distrust and work-to-rule 
behaviour, or does it provoke communication and joint learning? What 
is the role of formalization?  
 
8. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To acquire  an overview of the area, initial explorative interviews were 
performed with three consultants, two user representatives, one client 
representative and one representative of a service provider. To combine 
depth and generality, a semi-structured interview study was chosen. 
Another choice was to focus mainly but not exclusively on service 
providers and consultants, since both these categories of suppliers are 
involved in many relationships in parallel and also often have an 
international outlook. Thus, they should be better equipped than most 
clients to reflect on differences and trends. An interview guideline was 
developed, and interviews were then carried out with three client 
representatives, three consultants, and eight representatives of service 
providers. The interviewees were mostly higher level managers (FM 
manager, marketing manager, managing director). For three of the service 
provider companies, interviews were carried out also with contract 
managers more directly involved on an operational level. Thus, the service 
providers interviewed represented five companies. These companies 
differed in terms of the types and scope of services they provide as well as 
size. All client companies had experience from extensive outsourcing 
initiatives, and two of them had chosen total FM contracts. The interviews 
were carried out at the respondents’ offices and lasted between two and 
three hours.  
 
The areas covered in the interviews were (with some variations, depending 
on respondent category):  
- general questions about the respondent’s role and background, as 
well as the competence, strategy and histori cal development of the 
organization 
- views on trends, market characteristics and important areas of 
development 
- views on clients (procurement practices, competence, differences 
between clients)  
- views on suppliers (performance, competence, differences between 
suppliers) 
- role of consultants  
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- contracts and contract management (duration, pricing, use of Aff, 
specification, monitoring, communication, flexibility) 
- relational aspects (trust, risks, conflicts, trust-building strategies) 
- development and innovation (sources of development, incentives, 
impact of technology, FM in relation to core business strategy) 
- other issues (energy saving, space planning) 
 
9. INTERVIEW RESULTS 
In this section, the interviews with decision-makers in FM are summarized. 
It should be kept in mind that the statements are the subjective views of 
the respondents even if, for reasons of readability, they are sometimes 
presented as facts.  
 
Trends 
The service providers distinguish between different types of customers. 
“Mature” customers are businesses who have an explicit strategy for how 
to manage their support services, which most often results in outsourcing 
of large contracts for a wide range of services and/or sites. Many of these 
companies are multi-national, and their drivers for outsourcing are 
considered to be a combination of costs and flexibility. The general view is 
that support services have received increased attention from top 
management following from greater pressure to reduce costs. Contracts 
increasingly tend to encompass multiple sites on a regional, national or 
global basis. In the public sector the development has been slower, 
although several interviewees saw a trend that also public clients start to 
bundle services and sites. Many more clients now have experience from 
contracting out FM services, and some are procuring for the second or 
third time. However, several interviewees also mentioned cases where 
clients had taken back (“insourced”) FM services when their experiences 
from outsourcing had not been satisfactory.  
 
As mentioned before, the trend has been for service provider companies 
to grow by buying other supplier firms rather than by being awarded new 
contracts. Many interviewees stated that increased performance 
contracting, multi-site agreements and more complex contracts favour the 
large, international companies. The number of possible contractors would 
be significantly reduced for contracts covering wider geographical areas. 
The still existing Swedish companies are smaller, more specialised and act 
on a local or regional market. The demand for this kind of more limited 
service packages, however, seems to be growing faster than for the larger 
contracts, and one of the technical property management-oriented 
companies has been on a national list of fast-growing companies for 
several years. 
 
The large bulk of FM contracts still concern single or a few related 
services. Although many of those interviewed represented large 
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companies, their undertakings ranged from yearly contract values of less 
than SEK 1M to those of several hundreds of millions. In the last ten 
years, the price of property-related services has been drastically reduced, 
according to two interviewees by half. This reduction was not seen as 
connected to lower quality, but rather to better adjustment of service levels 
to needs, higher competence of staff and economies of scale.  
 
Foreign property owners  
There has been a significant increase in foreign ownership of Swedish 
property in recent years. This trend may benefit service providers, since 
these owners do not have in-house facilities management units. However, 
foreign owners often have a short-term, financial perspective and mainly 
buy building related services, which is why some of the interviewed service 
providers do not see them as really important customers. Still, other 
foreign owners have longer perspectives and sometimes introduce contract 
models where more risk is transferred to the contractor, for example that 
service providers guarantee running and maintenance costs over perhaps 
15 years. This is seen as challenging but favourable by the larger service 
providers. 
 
One problem that was mentioned in relation to foreign clients was that in 
Sweden, property owners have wider responsibilities tha n in many other 
countries. Leases are shorter and it is the owner and not the tenant who is 
responsible for maintenance, fulfilling government inspection 
requirements, etc. This creates problems for the property management 
contractors and complicates the development of sustainable business 
practice in asset management:  
“I think that it is important that they understand what we do, so that they don’t think 
that it is like buying property management in Germany, the UK or the US. We have to 
explain this, and we are not always successful in doing that. First and foremost, they 
don’t understand why we want so much money. They think that it’s only about collecting 
rents, and then we have to tell them how much work is included in the price. But many 
suppliers don’t do that and instead try to win contracts by submitting a low bid; they 
simply don’t charge enough to cover their costs and then can’t afford taking care of the 
building. Which means that the industry gets a bad reputation, that the suppliers don’t 
earn any money and the owners are dissatisfied.” 
 
The same difficulties were seen to apply to service contracts: “Foreign 
companies often have contracts that are not adapted to the Swedish context. Sometimes 
the contractor is required to assume risks that are not proportional to the contract 
volume or price. So working with international companies also has drawbacks.”  
 
Thus, with foreign owners, the risks for misunderstandings were felt to be 
higher. 
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Combining and integrating competences in FM   
The supplier companies have specific core competences but join with 
other companies by subcontracting or partnering to fulfill the needs of 
different clients. Some are specialised in “hard”, technical services, and 
some in “soft” business services. Their competences range from only a 
few technical services to offering almost all FM service with in-house 
personnel. There are several ways of reasoning concerning the cost and 
benefits of in-house competence and bundling. One of the companies said 
that their strategy was to have in-house competence for all FM services, 
the argument being that this gave better possibilities for integrating and 
finding synergies between different services, making the most of their 
personnel. To increase credibility in providing integrated FM services, they 
had recently incorporated also technical competence. The view that  an FM 
integrator has to have in-house competence was supported by another 
supplier: “The integrator has to be better than the client, I would never buy from a 
company who buys 50% from sub contractors. To buy it all from one supplier is a 
different matter.”  
 
A representative of a company which has all the competences from asset 
management to property management in-house says that it is precisely the 
daily contact with the buildings and the tenants which provides the 
knowledge that allows them to make a profit, both for themselves and 
their customers. Their competence is to know what buildings to keep, buy 
and sell, as well as to find those level of maintenance and tenant service 
that deliver the highest returns.  
 
Other respondents were  more favourable towards the possibility to 
perform well as an integrator. Another FM integrator company, for 
example, preferred to be more specialized: ”Our core competence is technical 
facilities management, and we prefer to buy soft services from companies who are 
specialised in those areas. Partly, it’s about credibility: it can seem a bit strange to say 
that we can do the cleaning, but we can also take care of your technical control systems .” 
 
One of the client representatives had a different view, and thought that it 
could be more difficult for providers to integrate in-house functions than 
to integrate subcontractors:  
 “I’m not entirely attracted by total solutions; a technical contractor who works with a 
partner can be just as good. We want a service partner who is excellent at coordination 
and integration and has good systems and tools, if they have it all in-house is not 
important. People tend to exaggerate the value of having all competence s in-house. For 
example, a service provider may be more reluctant to move a person who does perform 
well if it is an in-house employee.”   
   
According to this FM manager, the problem was rather that service 
providers are poor at integrating different functions, whether these are in-
house or subcontracted. For another client, who had carried out an 
outsourcing process several years ago, it had been important to have a 
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total, multi-service supplier, since they wanted all of their former 
personnel to be employed by the same company. A third client said that 
they wanted to be involved in the choice of subcontractors, since all 
personnel were important. According to the service providers, the 
involvement in subcontractor choice differed between clients.   
   
Other client worries regarding integration had to do with the competence 
profiles of management personnel: 
“I’m willing to pay for management and synergies, but I would probably not like to have 
a technician in the reception just because that’s what suits the supplier.” 
And, conversely: 
“One of our suppliers wants to broaden their competence so that they can undertake 
total contracts. That might be a good thing, there is some overlap today. But I don’t 
know if I want a cleaning supervisor in charge of building operations, I don’t think that 
the staff would like that. ”   
 
Clearly, there is a matching between categories of client companies and 
service providers, so that the large service providers which operate as FM 
integrators prefer to work directly with the international, “mature” clients, 
a role which providers of single services are not equipped for. However, 
most FM integrators do not exclusively work on total FM contracts but 
also act as providers of single services. There seem to be several reasons 
for this: existing long-term relations; that integrated FM contracts are few 
compared to the demand for single services; that a single service contract 
with a client inexperienced in outsourcing may subsequently lead to 
additional sales and, finally, the impact on perceived efficiency. That a 
provider of multiple services is able to win contracts for each service 
separately is seen as important in order to reassure customers of bundled 
services that the price of the total package is competitive. For similar 
reasons, service providers may choose to subcontract work also within 
areas where they have competence in-house. One of the contract 
managers interviewed was responsible for a contract where all services 
were procured separately , and the FM integrator was not granted the 
subcontracts. Thus, there can be a conflict of loyalty for the contract 
manager of the FM integrator.  
 
The larger service providers frequently work as both buyers and 
subcontractors in relation to their competitors. They may also form 
partnerships with firms having other competence profiles, where partners 
may alternate as integrators and subcontractors depending on the service 
mix desired in the individual contract. How contractors join for the 
purpose of gaining the larger contracts seems to be a delicate matter, 
related to issues of ownership and branding. For example, a partnership 
tends to dissolve if the partner is bought by a competitor, and this limits 
the possibilities for firms to make longer term mutual commitments. Also, 
a firm may choose to operate under one name when they act as single 
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service providers and subcontractors, and another when they assume an 
integrator role.   
 
It is clear that considerations of how to inspire trust in competence and 
efficiency guide suppliers in their choice of strategy, although there are 
different views of how such trust best is attained. Some FM integrators 
primarily emphasize value and others pursue low cost strategies in parallel 
to value adding strategies. Having competences in-house is often, but not 
always, seen as an advantage by clients.   
 
Outsourcing aspects 
In the interviews, outsourcing processes were primarily dealt with as a 
background to supplier strategies. A major obstacle to outsourcing, 
mentioned by several interviewees, was that decisions concerning how to 
handle support services were not made at strategic company levels. Lower 
level managers tended to be negative to outsourcing, since their own jobs 
would be affected. According to the interviewees, client employees 
generally did not have bad experiences from outsourcing processes. The 
larger service providers interviewed seldom had problems in finding work 
for personnel that they took over from a client in an outsourcing process, 
since they have many other contracts. However, a smaller supplier 
specialised in property management found requirements to take over 
personnel to be a problem, since their opportunities to transfer them to 
other contracts was limited. Obviously, this problem is more important in 
areas which are less densely populated, and where distances between sites 
are long. Further, the interviewees reported that different suppliers have 
different policies for adapting salaries and fringe benefits of outsourced 
staff to the FM industry standard, although the general opinion was that 
most companies avoided such conflicts. The suppliers’ view was that in the 
end, the impact on the work situation of former client employees was 
often favourable. That both clients and employees could find benefits was 
seen as one reason why acceptance of outsourcing had increased in recent 
years. 
 
Contract models 
Many of the clients in the FM area are international firms which tend to 
have their own models or develop contracts that are largely relationship-
specific. International service providers also have company-specific 
models, as do consultants who aid clients in writing bid documents. The 
general view was that the Aff system is used by the majority of the public 
clients, but much less commonly among private clients. However, this 
varies between services, so that the property management part is widely 
used also by Swedish private sector clients, while the business services part 
is less common. Firms may also use the Aff as a basis of service 
description, but stick to their own “General conditions”.  
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The perception of the service providers with an international outlook was 
that the Aff system is internationally unique and advanced. A standard was 
considered to facilitate sustainable industry development. One reason 
mentioned was that the risk is reduced that contractors bid low in 
anticipation of change orders in areas poorly defined in the bid 
documents: “I am very satisfied with Aff, it allows us to concentrate on finding 
solutions that benefit the client rather than on being smart in our bids”. Also, Aff was 
perceived as more logically structured that many client-specific contracts 
used by foreign firms.  
 
The main criticism concerned the rigidity and complexity of the system. 
One consultant found Aff inflexible and difficult to understand and 
avoided using it, but still thought that the system would gain in influence 
because of the need for a clear structure and terminology. There was also 
some concern that the focus in Aff on service specification is difficult to 
combine with goals of continuous improvement. Further, the Aff system 
requires that the client specifies what the contractor is supposed to do, and 
some interviewees found it awkward that the client should be more 
knowledgeable than the service provider. Other aspects which were 
considered weak in the Aff system concerned communication and 
integration. One client specifically missed a clear definition and 
specification of integrator functions. In his study of public contracts for 
technical property management, Sundsvik (2006) found that the 
communication routines stated in Aff where seldom followed in practice. 
 
Process or performance specification? 
The original Aff system is based on detailed descriptions of the service 
performed, for example specifying how often equipment should be 
checked, rooms cleaned or dustbins emptied. One problem, then, is that 
depending on variations in weather or utilization these frequencies might 
often be inadequate. Thus, models specifically adapted to performance 
requirements have been developed, and this option is now included also in 
the Aff system.  
 
According to one of the clients interviewed, they use performance 
contracts partly because this is preferred by suppliers. The suppliers 
interviewed, however, did not see only advantages with output 
specifications, and state several reasons why this principle is complicated 
to apply in practice. First, if the contractor is going to be responsible for 
performance, this requires that the status of the buildings served and other 
basic conditions are assessed and described more systematically. Thus, one 
concern was that performance requirements entail increased 
administration and measurement, mainly to the benefit of consultants 
providing inspection services. Also Sundsvik (2006)  stated that the lack of 
established standards for status inspections was a major problem. Further, 
several interviewees pointed at the increased risk of bid dumping and the 
difficulties of comparing bids.  
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Several interviewees also argued that the need for detailed specification 
remains, since the client and the contractor need to establish a common 
understanding of how the performance requirements are to be interpreted. 
Thus, also in contracts where requirements are few and general (e. g. “nice 
and clean”), contractors need to present more detailed information on 
what they intend to do to fulfill performance requirements. The original 
Aff may then be used as a basis for descriptions of work processes and 
division of responsibility.    
 
For less complex contracts, the contractor will often convert a 
performance requirement to frequency descriptions and develop work 
schedules in order to calculate a bid. If a building operations and grounds 
maintenance contractor is not located on site, a large part of the work is to 
visit the site and check the status of the premises. According to a provider 
of such services, performance requirements mainly complicate planning 
and scheduling in such cases. Further, one contractor argued that if the 
utilization of the premises is changed so that more service is required, it is 
easier to agree on the financial consequences if there is a mutual agreement 
of frequencies originally included.    
 
The interviewees in this study bring up more problems in relation to 
performance specification than the respondents in Sundsvik’s (2006) study 
do, who tend to emphasize that process specification does not make use of 
the contractors’ knowledge, commitment and experience, as well as the 
administration needed for small invoices. However, these respondents 
refer exclusively to public contracts, which are more rigid and cannot 
easily be changed during the process. Also, both status descriptions and 
performance monitoring were found to be areas in need of improvement, 
pointing at a risk that performance contracts are not managed they way 
they should be.   
 
Procurement and criteria 
Competitive tendering is the rule in the public sector, but was perceived as 
an important route to gain a contract also in the private sector, although 
the process would be more open and less formal. Pure negotiation, only 
involving one supplier, would occur primarily when outsourcing in-house 
FM functions and in cases when an existing service provider takes over 
one more task. The general view of suppliers was that price is very 
important as a selection criterion, and that also in cases where price had a 
fairly low formal weighting the client often chose to appoint the bidder 
with the lowest price. According to one interviewee, the prices offered 
would not differ much between the more experienced service providers, 
while new actors could diverge more. The fixed price of a contract, 
however, generally accounts for only a part of the total volume of services 
actually delivered. Also in well defined contracts in the public sector, 30-
50% of the total sales may come from services which are paid for on a 
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cost-plus or uni t price basis. In the private sector, an initial agreement can 
grow significantly as new services are added. This means that a supplier 
may submit a low bid for the basic agreement and anticipate that this will 
entail more profitable additional sales. 
 
All of the clients interviewed said that they had assigned much importance 
to competence and quality as criteria when procuring their contractors. 
Another aspect concerned the information included in the bid documents 
as a basis for the contractors to estimate the resources needed for the 
contract. One client had initiated discussions with potential suppliers to 
decide the optimal level of information, and said that the number of pages 
then had been reduced from 5000 pages to 700-1000. Another client did 
not want to the information to be very detailed, since this would 
communicate to the contractors that they did not have to take initiatives: 
“We don’t want a service provider who asks us about details. We could s ee that some of 
the bidders had such tendencies. But this is a big contract and there is going to be a lot of 
give and take. We don’t like to tell them what they should do; we want them to develop 
the service so that we can learn from that.” Thus, the ability to cope with 
incomplete specifications in this case became one of the competences 
evaluated.  
 
Contract duration and termination  
An issue where the interviewees’ opinions diverged somewhat regarded 
optimal contract duration. Three years was perceived as a typical contract 
period. However, contracts often include a prolongation option, for 
example 3+1, 2+2, 5+1 years. One respondent saw a trend that contract 
periods become longer, in the public sector up to six years. Sundsvik 
(2006) reports contract durations (including prolongation options) of 
between 4 and 13 years. One view was that the first outsourcing period 
requires a longer contract period, perhaps five years, since the contractor 
takes over staff and has to change the organization to increase efficiency. 
Another supplier maintained that all contracts should last at least five 
years, because it is difficult both to make any improvements and to obtain 
low prices from suppliers of coffee machines etc if the contract is only for 
three years.  
 
In the private sector it is not unusual that contracts are renewed without 
an explicit procurement process, but there can also be an explicit 
agreement that the relation will last for 10-15 years if the client is satisfied. 
When clients outsource their in-house functions, they often keep the same 
supplier for many years. This was perceived as a big problem by one of the 
consultants, who remarked that many client contract managers develop a 
loyalty towards the existing supplier, and that this prevents them from 
undertaking a formal procurement process. Another consultant said that if 
the terms of a contract turn out to be too bad for the existing supplier, the 
client often chooses to renegotiate the contractual terms: “As a service 
provider you get kicked out if you don’t seem interested in the client, otherwise they will 
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try to solve the problem”. This was confirmed by a service provider: “If a 
contract is unprofitable, we cancel it when it expires. In all big contracts we’ve had, this 
has resulted in renegotiation and a continued relationship.” Also in cases where the 
client thinks that the costs are too high, there tends to be a renewed 
negotiation rather than a break in the relationship. On the other hand, a 
service provider said that changing suppliers is a matter of experience, so 
that it is easier the second time when the employees know what to expect. 
Nearly all interviewed service providers regularly bid for contracts, and 
although their hit rate is higher in contracts that they already have, they do 
not refrain from bidding if they know that the client has an existing 
relationship with another contractor. 
 
A possibility is to include a running termination option of six months or 
one year, perhaps without any other duration agreements. One supplier 
perceived such contracts as very unfavourable to the contractor, while 
another argued that this kind of arrangements would mainly favour the 
professional and serious suppliers since the possibilities for contractors to 
win contracts by making far-reaching promises which they do not fulfil 
then is limited. Also, this could be a competitive advantage for larger 
suppliers who have many contracts and may spread risks. 
 
Further, it may happen that the building is sold during the contract period. 
Most building operations contracts in the private sector allow the new 
owner to terminate the relation, although, according to the suppliers, 
owners who do not have an in-house FM organization or an existing 
relation with a supplier most often keep a service provider who knows the 
building.  
 
Communication, monitoring and reporting 
Concerning monitoring of contractual performance, the general opinion of 
both clients and contractors was that this area has previously not received 
enough attention but is currently developing as contracting experience 
increases. The principles were most developed for cleaning services, where 
competition is fierce  and there is an accepted standard for performance 
measurements. There was also a view that the reasons for monitoring have 
changed. Before, data were mainly collected by consultants as a basis for 
benchmarking between their clients. Today, the focus is more on how 
measurement data can improve performance within the contract.  
 
Hard data (statistics for energy consumption, system interruptions, 
complaints, phone calls answered, volumes of post, etc) and inspections 
were important bases of performance assessments, but contract meetings 
were seen as the key monitoring mechanism. In most relations meetings 
are held at several levels in the organization, but frequencies vary between 
relations. Monthly or bi-weekly meetings were common on an operational 
level, while contract manager meetings took place every three months or 
twice a year. There could also be meetings on a strategic level, between top 
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management on both sides. Several interviewees said that it was common 
that communication and monitoring was frequent in the beginning of a 
relationship as well as when a renegotiation was approaching, but that 
activities tended to be less intense during the contract period. 
Communication routines are generally defined in the contract, and some 
clients also include agendas for different meetings in the bid documents. 
The general view was that contract management is becoming more 
formalized, so that meetings as well as inspections and measurements are 
planned and documented. It is considered crucial that those involved on 
both sides have a common understanding of the contract and activities. 
Thus, contracts increasingly include rules for how to start up a 
relationship, and sometimes this is done by a two day workshop which 
also serves a teambuilding purpose. Further, rules for how to transfer 
knowledge and responsibilities when there is a shift of suppliers are given 
more attention. Several interviewees gave examples of cases where the 
retiring supplier had caused significant trouble by refusing to cooperate, 
but their general impression was that these situations today are handled 
more professionally.  
 
IT based systems were seen as useful tools to increase transparency in 
contracts, regarding costs as well as decisions and processes. Technology 
could solve many communication problems, such as keeping track of 
reports of defects and making it possible for those affected to follow what 
had been done about the problem. As an example, possibilities to send 
codes by SMS made it easier for users to notify the service provider about 
defective equipment in conference rooms and other common areas, 
problems which otherwise are less likely to be reported. There are also bar-
code based systems to track when the personnel of service providers had 
carried out certain inspections and actions. Thereby, suppliers could 
present evidence when a client suspected that the contract requirements 
had not been fulfilled. This could be very efficient to promote trust in 
technical property ma nagement contracts which are too small to support a 
site based organization. 
 
Thus, the suppliers’ attitudes towards monitoring were generally 
approving. Client-induced measurements where seen helpful to them in 
their efforts to increase efficiency and service quality in their own work as 
well as their subcontractors’. A service provider with experience from 
clients with very high demands regarding measurement said that their 
competence and performance had significantly improved as a result. The 
drawback was that this requires systems that are costly to maintain, and 
relatively few clients request the high levels of professionalism thus 
acquired. According to the service providers, formal monitoring routines 
and ambitions vary widely between clients, and sometimes also between 
different sites of the same client. Requirements for measurement data were 
increasing, but clients as well as suppliers said that many clients routinely 
require much data that is never actually analysed. Thus, there was a 
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perceived need for development of more efficient reporting and 
monitoring systems.  
 
Increased formalization was also seen to have consequences for the 
competence profiles of supplier managers, who now need administrative 
skills in addition to technical competence and customer orientation. This 
could, however, be solved by providing them with administrative support. 
Another difficulty is that service volumes may change significantly as a 
consequence of changes in the client organizations, and then many 
performance targets become irrelevant. The substantial lay-offs in the IT 
sector after the millennium boom were mentioned by several interviewees.  
 
Customer satisfaction surveys 
Customer satisfaction questionnaires were widely employed, especially for 
the soft services such as reception and catering. However, the suppliers 
said that some clients were reluctant to bother their employees or tenants 
with questionnaires, and preferred more informal audits based on face-to-
face discussions. The interviewees also pointed at various risks in 
interpreting questionnaire results. Clients are complex organizations, and 
the quality of communication between the client’s contract management 
function and the employees or tenants varies. Especially when a firm is 
outsourcing FM services for the first time, the aim often is to reduce costs 
and the service level performed by the external provider might be quite 
different from what the users are used to receive from the in-house 
function. Thus, some service providers take great care to communicate to 
client employees or tenants what service levels should be expected. Here, 
web-based solutions were considered valuable, especially in high-tech 
companies where people are used to this type of communication.  Still, it 
was found to be difficult to get this information through to end-users:  
“You send a questionnaire once a year and ask them if they are satisfied with the 
services, but they don’t know what is written in the contract. Many services are poorly 
defined, and you may ask ‘Are you satisfied with the reception?’  But if you try to break 
it down further, it becomes too complicated. There are no simple, user-friendly Service 
Level Agreements.”  
 
Another aspect that may impact on customer satisfaction is if there are 
private relations between users and service provider staff, and according to 
one client sites in smaller towns tended to receive higher ratings than the 
more anonymous settings. Further, one supplier maintained that the 
familiarity of the supplier brand may also influence customer sati sfaction, 
so that after a change of supplier users tended to give lower ratings to an 
unknown firm, even when the same people worked with the contract and 
service levels were unchanged. Despite all these concerns, questionnaires 
were still considered valuable since they gave input for making 
improvements. Also, the views of active but perhaps not so representative 
end-users could be checked against the total volume of questionnaire 
responses. Questionnaires, as well as other means of end-user 
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involvement, could further help contractors to show client contract 
management functions that a demand for change came from the 
customers and not from the service provider.   
 
Public and private sector clients 
Although the international private sector companies were perceived as the 
most advanced and mature clients, many public clients were mentioned by 
suppliers as being among the best. One view was that on average, the two 
groups were equivalent in competence. However, public clients are by 
definition national or local, which limits the volume of their service 
contracts. Still, several suppliers say that public sector clients often choose 
to tender smaller service packages than they could do: “The public sector 
wants to be so fair! Instead of procuring one big contract, they divide it into several small 
packages, which is really not very efficient. They lose opportunities for synergies and 
flexibility. A private company would choose the most efficient alternative.” This agrees 
with the findings of Sundsvik (2006), where the public clients report that 
they prefer to keep part of the technical property management in-house, 
tender geographically limited packages, and design contracts that are 
attractive also to the local suppliers. 
 
Also political pressure was mentioned as an influential factor: ”There are, in 
our view, too strong purchasing organizations in the local authorities. These are 
convinced that everything gets cheaper if each part is tendered individually, and they don’t 
conside r the total costs.” 
   
Another opinion held by the suppliers was that public sector clients tend 
to be more stable and conventional, which could have both positive and 
negative effects:  
“The public sector tends to make well founded decisions; they are less affected by short 
term financial considerations. There is a credibility and stability, which the private sector 
sometimes does not have. A five year contract is a five year contract. On the other hand, 
the private sector is more dynamic.” 
 
Drawbacks of the public sector culture were claimed to be that the time 
required to ensure organizational support delayed decisions, and also that 
less authority was delegated to the service providers, thereby harming 
service quality. As an example, a service provider said that in the private 
sector they were authorized to take actions up to a cost of SEK 10,000 in 
case of a technical failure, while in the public sector all costs over SEK 2-
3,000 would have to be formally approved by the client in advance.  
 
Incentives for innovation  
The terms of payment vary much between contracts. To accommodate for 
changes, there are often combinations of fixed prices, unit prices and cost-
plus payments. Fixed price principles are more prevalent in limited service 
packages, and in the study by Sundsvik (2006), nearly 80% of the public 
contracts were pure fixed price. In total FM contracts, cost-plus 
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arrangements, perhaps with a guaranteed maximum price, are more 
common. Payment principles can also be based partly on building area and 
partly on the number of work desks served.  
 
Specific incentives to encourage innovation and improvements are 
included in some contracts. Fees in asset management contracts are related 
to the profit delivered to the property owner, and incentives are then 
designed to align the interests of service provider employees with those of 
the owner. In all types of contracts, there may be agreements that costs 
should be reduced by a certain percentage each year. It is common that 
ideas for improvements come up during the contract period, as the service 
provider becomes familiar with the property and the business served. In 
such cases, gains are often shared between the customer and the supplier. 
However, it is also common that an investment is required to reduce costs, 
and this may lead to discussion about how these costs should be divided 
between the parties. One of the clients interviewed had put up an 
investment fund in the contract, which the contractor could use after 
approval from the client.  
 
Incentives to reduce energy consumption had been used with varying 
success. According to one of the clients, incentives were tricky to 
implement in practice, at least for complex buildings, since technical 
changes are made continuously. Thus, it can be hard to estimate the 
service provider’s contribution to savings or increases in consumption. 
Instead, contractors can be required to account for what they have done to 
increase energy efficiency and rewarded accordingly. Nevertheless, there 
are several examples of agreements that transfer more risk to the suppliers, 
such as contracts where the supplier inspects the building systems and 
guarantees the total running cost over a longer period of time. To be able 
to assume more risk, the service providers need to have several contracts 
of this type, which benefits larger contractors: “You can’t have just one such 
contract. If one lift breaks down, it can cost you half a million crowns. If you have 20 
contracts, the risk is reduced.” 
 
Public procurement regulations limit the possibilities to make more 
substantial changes in the contract contents, and although relations with 
public clients could be collaborative, the legal rules were perceived as an 
obstacle to develop a true partnership relation based on a mutual 
commitment to improvement. Formal public partnership contracts are 
very rare, and Sundsvik (2006) found only one contract of this type . 
 
Industry level trust 
There are different opinions among those interviewed about the level of 
trust and conflict in FM relations in general. Several interviewees had a 
background in construction and found the FM industry as harmonious in 
comparison. None of them knew of disputes that had been resolved in 
courts, a fact which they attributed to the long term relationships in FM.  
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However, some still maintain that the industry has a bad reputation and 
that clients in general are dissatisfied because they do not receive the 
service quality they have expected. The price focus in competitive 
tendering of smaller service packages was perceived as a big problem, both 
by consultants and suppliers, leading to profit levels of no more than 1 to 
5%. One contractor said that “The bidding documents are often fuzzy and to be 
honest a supplier who includes everything that is written there will not get many 
contracts. The client is not prepared to pay that much. On the other hand, if it is 
obvious that they have forgotten something, we include it. It’s much about give and 
take .” There was also a view that the suppliers themselves perhaps focused 
too much on price and did not make use of the opportunities to score 
higher on the other contract award criteria. One interviewee involved in 
asset management said that they seldom participated in open procurement 
contests: “We want to earn money, and often the winning bid is way too low. The 
supplier who gets the contract will not be able to deliver a service that will allow the 
property owner to make a profit. You’ve got the wrong focus if you see yourself as a cost. 
We don’t want to be involved in that.”… “Say that we would receive a higher fee, then 
we could give this customer a lot more time. And the spin-off from that could be ten 
times higher”. 
 
Another service provider reflected upon the cultural differences between 
countries in how contracts are managed: “In Scandinavia, contracts are generally 
very detailed, but if the client has forgotten to include something we think that it is 
natural that we shall do it. While in Italy, for example, if you have signed a contract, 
they can say ‘This contract, when was it signed? Two months ago, but a lot has 
happened in two months…The contract is more of a letter of intent’. And in the UK, 
what’s not written in the contract is not included. If the client has forgotten, it will be an 
extra cost. While in Sweden, it wouldn’t. And the client thinks in the same way. If the 
supplier has missed something, clients exploit the opportunity in many countries.  In 
Sweden, both parties agree that it is not reasonable and find a solution. So the cultural 
differences are bigger than you think, also between the Nordic countries” 
 
According to the interviewees, the trust problems in the FM sector do not 
pertain to individual relations as much as to clients’ trust in the value of 
outsourcing and in the suppliers’ capability to deliver the services to the 
client’s satisfaction. Client perceptions of supplier capacity were seen as 
central in outsourcing decisions: “The clients are not distrusting, they are afraid of 
losing control. When they outsource a competence, the organization loses this competence, 
and this is perhaps more about self-confidence than confidence in suppliers. It can 
influence the scope of the contract, a client could achieve a higher efficiency by contracting 
out more, but they dare not take one more step. In my experience, it has a lot to do with 
confidence in supplier capacity”.  
 
Thus, a less rapid growth was considered more sustainable:  
“… it has become more accepted to buy support services from external suppliers, which 
is closely related to the development in supplier capacity. This is probably how this kind 
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of service market grows. When so much depends on cooperation and partnerships, growth 
is very incremental.” 
 
“If there had been an explosion, as many people said there would be, the suppliers would 
not have been able to maintain quality, and this would have harmed the whole 
industry.” 
 
The Aff system was seen as a key factor in industry development: “Many 
advances which seemed utopian in 1995 have now become reality. Before, only the 
private property owners and the housing cooperatives bought support services. It all 
started when the Aff standard agreement was issued, there was a need for a tool to 
support procurement processes.” 
 
Industry level associations can be another source of legitimacy and trust. 
IFMA, the International Facilities Management Association, has a Swedish 
chapter. The Swedish FM industry sustains a number of annual 
conferences and a few trade magazines. Here, experiences from FM 
contracts and related advice are communicated, and surveys of contracting 
practice and experiences are other sources of information. The views on 
these associations and events are mixed; the interviewees acknowledge 
their importance, but especially suppliers wished that more clients would 
participate. The number of larger service providers is low, and they all 
know each other well and watch each other closely. A complaint was that 
although everybody knows much about what’s going on in different 
companies and contracts, suppliers still try to be secret about it, a 
behaviour that does not support development. Still, respondents reported 
that there was much imitation in the industry, and that if someone came 
up with something new, it would not be long before this was taken up by 
others. Bidding documents of public clients are very easy to get access to 
and copy, and also contractor bids may sometimes be obtained from 
public agencies. Recent examples of imitation in this area were 
improvements in bid layout, including also photos, and reports in the form 
of yearbooks. Another activity mentioned was that it has become 
increasingly common the last five years that both consultants and clients 
contact the suppliers before starting a procurement process, or requests 
their opinions on the bidding documents, to ensure mutual understanding 
and an appropriate risk structure.   
 
Consultants were seen as valuable market actors, since they have many 
clients and are perceived as more objective than service providers. 
However, there was no consensus as to whether it was clients, service 
providers or consultants that were the main drivers of development. The 
issue of professionalization is promoted by IFMA, advocating certification 
of facilities managers. This question was not explicitly addressed in the 
interviews, nor was it spontaneously mentioned by any of the interviewees.  
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Contract level trust and conflicts 
When it comes to the interviewees’ own experiences of particular relations, 
they report that conflicts tend to be few and easy to resolve. The service 
providers say that ability to build relations with clients is becoming 
increasingly important, and that this affects their recruitment and 
management training. Service mentality and customer focus is increasingly 
seen as more important than technical competence, also in the more 
technically oriented firms. Several interviewees maintain that persons with 
a more general competence profile often do a better job as contract 
managers than those with a long construction experience, both on the 
service provider side and in a client function. Women are increasingly 
found in these positions, a trend that is appreciated.   
 
In the context of an FM contract, the respondents believe that 
dissatisfaction with service quality is the main cause of conflicts. Clients 
tend to be particularly disappointed when the service provider seems to 
show a low commitment to the relationship. A consultant remarked that 
there was a difference between services: “For building operations , it is generally 
the client function – often the owner of the building – who is dissatisfied. When it comes 
to soft services, it is usually the end users.” A supplier contract manager said that 
the most problematic services were those where people tended to have 
different opinions, such as cleaning and catering. Again, it was emphasized 
that the contents of a new contract have to be communicated to both end 
users and service provider staff, especially if the service level is changed.  
 
When a service provider demands compensation for extra costs, this is 
perceived to cause conflicts mainly if the supplier has difficulties in 
explaining the costs. According to the service providers, this is seldom a 
problem in soft or integrated services, where the service provider is 
located at the client’s premises. Then, the client employees get to know the 
service provider personnel and also can see the acti ons taken. Discussions 
may however arise when it is not clear who is responsible, for example 
when equipment or building components break down or are damaged. 
Further, when a service is added or withdrawn from a multi -service 
contract, the financial consequences can be difficult both to estimate and 
to justify. Also, reception services were mentioned as hard to specify and 
monitor: “What is included in reception services? It is easy to specify on a basic level: 
answering phones etc. But how much administration and copying? When does it become 
a project? What about helping the sales department to call up customers? In this area 
there are often different opinions and the reception gets to do secretary work. And how 
do you measure if someone is nice?”  
 
When the contractor is not co-located with the client, conflicts seem to be 
more common. Here, questions can arise as to whether the service 
provider has actually delivered the service as specified in the contract, or 
doubt can be cast on the level of repair costs. However, according to the 
service providers many conflicts can be prevented by systematic 
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communication and by informing the client about upcoming costs in 
advance.  
  
In building operations and maintenance contracts, a difficult area was how 
to define and regulate responsibilities concerning planned maintenance vs. 
unplanned repairs. To avoid a great number of small invoices and to 
motivate contractors to take better care of the systems, there is often an 
excess clause so that repairs below a certain cost (SEK 5,000 – 15,000) are 
to be included in the fixed price. The respondents have different opinions 
about this, and in large contracts for professional clients it is perceived as 
being mainly a matter of predictability. Some years ago suppliers had no 
statistics to base their estimates on, but this problem has diminished as 
experience has accumulated. However, there can be problems since the 
need for repair work is dependent on the level of planned maintenance, 
which is the client’s responsibility. Thus, an opportunistic client can 
choose not to replace a system and let the contractor pay for all the small 
failures. This area is also identified by Sundsvik (2006) as a difficult one, 
especially if damage due to vandalism is to be included.  
 
Another problematic area concerns relations to other parties. In many 
cases, the building owner establishes contracts with service providers in 
building operations and maintenance, while other service providers are 
contracted by the occupier. The collaboration and division of 
responsibility between these parties is considered difficult by several 
respondents. 
 
10. DISCUSSION 
As stated earlier, there are various types of trust, associated with specific 
bases and development processes. Notably, generalized trust is produced 
on a society level, and interacts with formal contracts and direct 
interpersonal contacts in shaping a specific exchange relationship. This 
discussion section deals, in turn, with industry level aspects, contract and 
knowledge management aspects on relationship management, and how 
patterns of interaction tend to influence contracting needs.     
 
Industry level trust 
Trust takes different forms and has different roles in an existing 
relationship (ex post) compared to before this relationship has been 
established (ex ante). When asked about trust problems the interviewees 
mainly emphasize the ex ante context. A key issue was if potential clients 
feel confident in shifting from in-house to outsourced FM service 
provision. Such confidence is influenced by trust in suppliers as a 
collective rather than by trust in a specific supplier, and experiences of 
client staff in other organizations that have gone through an outsourcing 
process play an important role. Industry seminars and trade magazines 
provide areas for communicating such experiences, and also allow 
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suppliers to influence perceptions of them as trustworthy and competent. 
Thus, professional associations and industry networks play a vital role in 
promoting ex ante trust.  
 
The development of the Aff system of standards was highlighted by most 
interviewees. Most common was to refer to its role as a tool to facilitate 
service procurement, but the participation of important clients in the Aff 
committee should also increase the perceived legitimacy of the practice of 
contracting out.  A standard contract signals objectivity and stability (Vlaar, 
2005), which should be especially important in an area such as FM 
contracting, which is both complex and new to many of those involved. 
 
Among factors that counteract trust in outsourcing, respondents mention 
the turbulence in the FM industry. That companies buy and sell FM units 
affects the competence structure and brands of the firms immediately 
involved, and such re-structuring demands resources. However, since a 
partner can quickly turn into a competitor it also impacts on the general 
possibilities for FM suppliers to establish credible partnerships. A 
concentration into fewer and larger companies, in itself, has a mixed 
impact on generalised trust. On the one hand, trust in perceived financial 
credibility and competence should increase for a larger company, but on 
the other hand consolidation also results in reduced competition, which is 
seen as a trust problem by some potential clients. Further, as noted by 
several respondents, the growth of outsourcing should not be too rapid. 
Suppliers must be able to absorb new employees, educate them and 
socialize them into a service provider role in order to produce satisfied 
customers that are willing to share their experiences. 
 
Interestingly, the respondents hold varying views on the pros and cons of 
service providers delivering most services with their own staff. Some 
customers believe that in-house competences provide for a closer 
relationship between disciplines, while others see a risk that the 
integrator’s loyalty towards the in-house functions may overtake the loyalty 
to the customer, resulting in, for example, higher prices or in that 
employees who are not doing a good job are not replaced. To the first type 
of customer, it seems counter-productive that service providers 
subcontract services that they have in-house, while the second type of 
customer would prefer subcontracting. Some service providers organize to 
be attractive to all types of customers, while others avoid price-focused 
procurement. A value-orientated strategy reduces the number of potential 
customers, but grants profits and opportunities for professional 
development in the contracts obtained. A serve-all strategy may allow 
service providers to make contact with first-time buyers and then little by 
little earn their trust and transform the relationship towards increased 
collaboration. Thus, the differences in competence mixes and strategies 
between and within suppliers can be explained partly by an adaptation to 
the trust preferences of different customers. However, a complex supplier 
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market should hinder the development of industry level trust, which partly 
depends on perceptions of transparency and stability.  
  
Specifications and contracting  
Clearly, both formal contracts and relationship characteristics vary much. 
Some relationships are close and collaborative, while others are more arms’ 
length. However, adversarial relations seem to be rare; a bad relationship is 
more about poor management and low commitment. Exchanges can start 
as transactional single service contracts and successively transform to 
wider and closer relationships. Further, there does not seem to be a 
straightforward relation between levels of trust and collaboration and the 
form of contract. Closely specified contracts procured by competitive 
tendering can support also fairly collaborative relations. In less extensive 
and complex contracts, process/input specifications are prevalent, 
although there was a trend towards performance specification. The 
respondents identified several disadvantages in specifying agreements in 
terms of processes:  
- Process specification demands too detailed knowledge and too 
much resource upfront from the client. Some respondents find it 
wrong that clients should have thi s competence, while others think 
that the client has to have it.  
- All minor changes entail administration of extra payments, and 
these negotiations may lead to conflicts and distrust.   
- Suppliers may become reliant on client instructions and less prone 
to take own initiatives. Overall performance and quality may be 
overlooked, and process specification can result in a lack of a wider 
innovation and improvement focus.  
 
These arguments in much echo the criticism put forward in the FM 
literature and the general preference that many authors (e. g. Atkin and 
Brooke, 2000; Davis, 2004) express for output/performance requirements 
and partnerships. Still, judging from the interview responses, performance 
specification does not seem to be perceived as an uncomplicated solution 
to the contracting problems in FM. Reasons mentioned are: 
- Detailed process specifications form the basis for gaining a mutual 
understanding of what is included in a contract. This is important 
to set expectations right, especially when service levels are changed 
as a result of an outsourcing process.  
- It is easier to agree about changes in the contract and their 
financial consequences when there is a mutual understanding of 
the prevailing agreement. Thus, it is not evident that process 
specification always limits flexibility.  
- Client-induced monitoring acts as a help for suppliers to maintain 
quality in their own and their subcontractors’ service delivery. 
Monitoring is also seen as a protection against distrust rather than 
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as a threat by suppliers. However, monitoring is more resource-
consuming for performance requirements, since these often 
require status descriptions and input from consultants.  
- Especially in procurement of smaller service packages, for which 
competition is high, clear specifications may support sound 
competition and assure that the selected contractor is able to fulfill 
the contractual obligations. With performance contracts, the 
difficulties to monitor performance lead to greater risks that 
suppliers with unrealistically low bids are awarded contracts.  
- Performance contracting is seen as more risky and administratively 
demanding, so that smaller contractors refrain from bidding and 
competition is reduced.   
 
The conventional view of specification and monitoring activities is that 
these belong to the control system, with a primary goal to mitigate 
opportunism by defining terms of exchange and assessing if obligations 
have been fulfilled. However, many such activities can also be seen as parts 
of a system for knowledge management, or learning (Madhok, 2006). 
Formalization may have important implications also for communication, 
in terms of channels, frequencies and contents (Vlaar et al., 2006).  
 
As indicated by the respondents’ statements, process specifications may 
have advantages from a knowledge management perspective. They provide 
for clear and mutual expectations, since they require communication 
upfront and are relatively easy to monitor. Performance specifications, if 
they are not thoroughly processed, imply a risk that the parties enter into a 
contract with different expectations of what the agreed service levels stand 
for in terms of activities and frequencies. Although monitoring of 
performance levels should be a better input to discussions, there is a risk 
that clients are tempted to economize on these activities, a tendency that 
was evident in Sundsvik’s (2006) study. Further, if status inspections are 
carried out by consultants there are no joint learning benefits to the 
interacting parties.  
 
That a relationship entails both communication needs and needs to 
control performance becomes evident in partnership contracts. Here, a 
formal contract based on more general performance requirements is often 
complemented with more detailed process specifications, which are not 
part of the formal contractual control system. In these relations, the 
Swedish Aff system may be used to direct attention to aspects that are 
important to consider and force parties to discuss and agree on service 
levels and divisions of responsibility. Opportunism is mitigated partly by 
reputation effects and partly by performance measurements. These deliver 
data on agreed key performance indicators which may be used for 
benchmarking and tied to compensation schemes. It is evident from the 
supplier interviews that such performance measurements are not perceived 
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as controlling but seen as important parts of the knowledge management 
system. The conclusion is that performance contracts allow for flexibility 
and learning, but that this requires that measures to create a mutual 
understanding and feedback systems are put in place. 
 
Contracting and interaction  
Another aspect which influences contracting needs is the interaction 
between the supplier and buyer during the service delivery. As mentioned 
by Lehtonen and Salonen (2006), the fact that the service provider is 
located on the premises of the client is important in shaping the 
relationship. Human beings in direct contact will establish some kind of 
relationship, and a service process that requires close interaction between 
employees on both sides will be influenced by interpersonal trust (or 
distrust), loyalties and dependencies.  
 
In many FM services, there is direct contact not only between the contract 
managers of the parties, but also between the service provider personnel 
and the end users (often the employees of the business served). With time, 
the service provider often comes to know more about the needs and 
problems of the end users than the client’s contract manager does. These 
relationships produce opportunities for influence. For example, the service 
provider and the end users may join forces in convincing the client to 
make changes to the contract, such as increasing service levels or 
incorporating new services. Also, end users may persuade the service 
provider to do more than what is actually included in the contract. A 
supplier is dependent on good communication and relations with end 
users to deliver high quality services and obtain favourable results in 
customer satisfaction questionnaires. Thus, when there is a daily and direct 
interaction with end users, as in the case of many soft services, detailed 
service specifications are needed to communicate to the users what 
services they should expect. Moreover, it is often more in the interest of 
service providers than clients that such specifications are established. In 
technical property management , on the other hand, there is less interaction 
with end users. The main contact is between the client’s property 
management function and the service provider, who are more familiar with 
the contents of the contract. Needs for formalized specification on a 
detailed level should then be lower, providing that mutual understanding 
has been established. However, these contacts may be less frequent and 
more related to contract management, and it is not evident that relational 
trust develops. Therefore , processes of specification and monitoring can 
be needed to grant that communication enabling individuals to form 
relationships and prevent distrust takes place. In both cases, however, 
monitoring data may demonstrate performance to higher levels of 
management. Such information also serves as valuable input to 
discussions, and allow suppliers to respond to goals of improvement. 
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11. CONCLUSIONS 
Facilities management is a complex field and industry level institutions as 
well as markets are in rapid development. While industry level efforts to 
develop standard contracts and create trust in contracting out FM services 
have been successful, contracting practice is slower to harmonize because 
of the influx of first time clients. 
 
Overall, the findings have supported the view that inter-organizational 
relationships are influenced by factors on an industry level as well as by the 
formal contract, contracting processes and interaction patterns in the 
specific relationship. A contracting culture depends not only on formal 
contracts but also on the informal interaction that arises spontaneously as 
a result of the service characteristics. Some relations may need fostering of 
trust, while others are better helped by more formal control and a bit of 
distance. Needs for specification, communication and monitoring should 
be analysed with respect to both goals of control and goals of knowledge 
transfer and learning. This complexity should be a challenge to FM 
integrators.  
 
Compared to core services, formalization can be the more important to 
attract client interest in FM services and other service s which are not 
perceived as strategic. Then, specifications and especially monitoring 
during the contract generate tangible and accessible information that can 
provide a starting point for discussion about contractual performance and 
improvement. Less extensive contracts may, paradoxically, result in less 
innovation because of lower client and supplier engagement. Thus, many 
FM contracts are examples of cases where elaborated contracts and 
monitoring will support both the development of trust and learning.  
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